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1 Introduction
We study the existence of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria in two-
person perfect information games. There is a state space X and each period
players possible actions are a subset of X. This set of feasible actions
depends on the current state, which is determined by the choice of the other
player in the previous period. We assume that X is a compact Hausdor¤
space and that action correspondence has an acyclic and asymmetric graph.
For some states there may be no feasible actions and then the game ends.
Payo¤s are either discounted sums of utilities of the states visited, or the
utility of the state where the game ends. We give su¢ cient conditions for the
existence of equilibrium when either feasible action sets are nite or when
playerspayo¤s are continuously dependent on each other. The latter class
of games includes zero-sum games and pure coordination games.
Given an initial state x0 2 X, player i0 starts the game by choosing some
action x1 from the set A(x0) of feasible actions. After that his opponent
chooses an action from A(x1), and so on. Hence given an initial state x0
and a rst mover i0, we have a perfect information extensive form game.
A (pure) Markov strategy of player i selects one feasible action to each
state (whenever there are feasible actions). In a Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE), players Markov strategy is a best reply against the Markov strategy
of the opponent.
We nd Markov equilibrium attractive as a solution concept. It is simple
and usually easy to interpret. Here we discuss the existence of such equilib-
ria. Of course, one would like to get a deeper understanding if, and when,
restriction to Markov strategies makes sense. We will not deal with such
foundational issues here, but see e.g. Bhaskar et.al (2010) and Doraszelski
and Escobar (2009).
Well-known papers dealing with the existence of a pure strategy sub-
game perfect equilibrium (SPE) in perfect information games include Harris
(1985a,b), Hellwig and Leininger (1987), Hellwig et.al (1990). Harris (1985a)
is a representative paper. In his paper terminal histories are innitely long.
The main assumptions for the existence of a pure SPE are:
1. the set of terminal histories is compact,
2. payo¤s over terminal histories are continuous.
So discounting is a special case but other payo¤ structures such as limit
of means (of time averages) or quitting games are not dealt with. Markov
equilibria are also not studied.
Fink (1964) shows the existence of a mixed strategy MPE in a nite
action, nite states case with discounting. Solan and Vieille (2003) show
the existence of an " -SPE in mixed strategies for quitting games. In
such games the active player in at stage n 2 N has two options: to stop the
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game in which case payo¤s are realized, or to let the game to continue to
stage n + 1. Kuipers et.al. (2009) study a version of this game in which
the active player can either quit or give the move to any other player (in
e¤ect there are n states). They show that there exists a pure strategy SPE
although a Markov perfect equilibrium need not exist.
By analyzing the examples where a pure MPE does not exist, we can
often nd a technical reason that explains such an anomaly. Then we can
make assumptions to get around these problematic cases and nd conditions
that are su¢ cient for the existence of a pure MPE.
Besides acyclicity and irreexivity of the action correspondence, another
important assumption is that to each uncountable subset Y  X there ex-
ists a state in Y such that the next state cannot be in Y (Assumption 2).
That is, either there exists a state (a terminal state) in Y where there are
no actions available, or there is a state in Y such that the next state is
necessarily outside of Y . Actually this property can be seen as a generaliza-
tion of acyclicity and irreexivity to uncountable subsets. Namely, if we we
formulate Assumption 2 for nite subsets, then this property boils down to
irreexivity and acyclicity.
We show that if the set of feasible actions is nite, and the closure of
the action correspondence satises Assumptions 1 and 2, then there exists a
Markov perfect equilibrium (Theorem 1). Utility functions over states can
be arbitrary.
When the feasible action sets may be innite, we assume that the action
correspondence and utilities over states are continuous. If players utilities
are continuously dependent and Assumption 2 holds, then there exists a
Markov perfect equilibrium, given that a relatively weak technical assump-
tion (Assumption 3, p. 9) is satised (Theorem 2; Theorem 3). Players
utilities are continuously dependent for example in zero-sum games and in
pure coordination games.
In Section 2 examples of games with no pure MPE are studied. The
model and notation is introduced in Section 3. The results are given in
Section 4. In Section 5 the assumptions of the model are discussed.
2 Examples with no pure MPE
EXAMPLE 1. [Adapted from Flesch et.al. (1997); Solan-Vieille (2003);
Kuipers et.al. (2009).]
The state space is X = f1; 2; 3g, player i 2 f1; 2; 3g has the move at
state i and can either quit or give the move to player i+1 (where 3+1 = 1).
Utilities from states i are zero, no discounting. There is no pure MPE.
Staying in the cycle cannot be an MPE. If i should quit, then i  1 would
not quit, in which case i 2 would certainly quit. But then i would not quit.
A pure SPE exists: if i starts the game, i should quit. If after some history
j should quit but deviates, then as a punishment j + 1 must not quit and
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j + 2 must quit.
EXAMPLE 2. [Solan-Vieille (2003).] The state space is X = f1; 2g, player
i 2 f1; 2g has the move at state i and can either quit or give the move to
player i+1. Utilities from states i = 1; 2 are zero, discounting 1=2 <   1.
No pure MPE. If 1 should quit, then 2 would quit. But then 1 would
not quit, and 2 would not quit. But then 1 would quit. No mixed MPE
if  = 1. A pure SPE when 1=2 <  < 1. (Solan-Vieille have N as a state
space (how many periods the game has lasted), so their Markov strategy is
not Markov in our model.)
When action sets are innite, there need not exist an optimal policy
even if utility function and action correspondence are continuous and time
horizon is nite.
EXAMPLE 3. A one-person game, X = [ 1; 1], the action correspondence
is A(x) = [x + 1; 1] for x  0; A(x) = ; for x > 0. Utility from state x is
u(x) =  x2. Either discounted sum of utilities from states, or utility only
from the terminal states (x > 0). No optimal actions. Assume discounting,
0 <   1, and initial state  1. Then by choosing x = 0 player gets
 1 + 0   2 =  1   2. By choosing x > 0 player gets  1   x2, which
increases to  1 as x goes to zero. Hence no optimal strategy. The same
holds for the payo¤ structure such that non-zero payo¤s are available at the
terminal states only.
3 The Model
We study the following kind two-person games on a nonempty set X. An
initial state x0 2 X of the game is given, and player i0 2 f1; 2g is called to
make a choice x1 from a set of actions A(x0)  X (this assumption is not
restrictive as demonstrated in Section 5). If A(x0) is empty, then the game
is over. If A(x0) 6= ;, the choice x1 is the state of the game in period 2, and
then player i1 6= i0 makes a choice from a set A(x1)  X, if A(x1) 6= ;. If
the state of the game is xt after t stages, player it 2 f1; 2g makes a choice
from a set A(xt)  X, if A(xt) 6= ;, and otherwise the game is over. If t is
odd, then it = i1, and if t is even then it = i0. A state x 2 X is a terminal
state, if A(x) = ;.
We assume that the set X is a compact Hausdor¤ space. We may view
the action sets A(x) as images of a relation A  XX: A(x) = fy j (x; y) 2
Ag. The relation A is asymmetric, if for all x 2 X, x =2 A(x). The relation
A is acyclic if for all paths (x0; : : : ; xt) such that xn+1 2 A(xn), n < t, it
holds that x0 =2 A(xt).
Recall that a relation A is closed if A  X X is closed, when X X
has the product topology. The relation A may also be viewed as a corre-
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spondence x A(x). The correspondence (or relation) A has closed values,
if A(x)  X is closed for every x 2 X. Closed correspondences have closed
values. Since X is compact Hausdor¤, A is closed i¤ A is an upper semi-
continuous correspondence with closed values. The correspondence A is
continuous, if it is both upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous.
The game has perfect information: each stage t the player it observes the
history ht = (x0; : : : ; xt 1). Denote by Ht the set of all histories of length t,
and let H = [tHt be the set of all histories. We consider feasible histories
only: ht = (x0; : : : ; xt 1) is such that xk 2 A(xk 1), for all k = 1; : : : ; t  1.
We may denote the feasible set of actions after history ht = (x0; : : : ; xt 1)
by A(ht) or by A(xt 1).
A strategy of player i 2 f1; 2g is a function si : H  ! X such that
si(h
t) 2 A(htt 1). A Markov strategy si is such that si(ht) depends only
on the state htt 1 of the game in period t. That is, a Markov strategy is a
function si on X such that si(x) 2 A(x) if A(x) is nonempty. (One may
wonder if the perfect information assumption is in contradiction with the
Markov property since action for both players is dened on states where
actions are available. It is demonstrated in Section 5 that this is not the
case.)
Given a strategy prole s = (s1; s2), let h(s) be the path or play generated
by it, i.e., either h(s) = ht = (x0; : : : ; xt 1) for some t, or else h(s) = fxtg1t=0
is an innite sequence of elements xt 2 X. In the former case, let T (s) =
t   1, so T (s) is the time index of the terminal state. In the latter case
A(xt) 6= ; for all t, and then we dene T (s) = 1. If T (s) < 1, the last
action taken is h(s)T (s) and this is also the terminal state xt 1 of the game.
Let ui : X  ! R be a utility function of player i 2 f1; 2g. We study
the game with two di¤erent specications of payo¤s over strategies. In the
rst specication, the payo¤ of i 2 f1; 2g is the discounted sum of his future
payo¤s:
Ui(s) =
T (s)X
t=0
tui(ht(s)); (1)
where  is the discount factor, 0 <  < 1.
In the second specication, the payo¤ of i 2 f1; 2g is
Ui(s) =

ui(hT (s)(s)) if T (s) <1
0 if T (s) =1 (2)
So in this case players get zero if s generates an innite history, and otherwise
they get the payo¤ of the terminal state hT (s)(s) = xT (s). In (1), if the
game ends in nite time, the path that leads to a terminal state also a¤ects
payo¤s.
We denote by  (x0; i0) = (X;A; x0; i0; u1; u2), x0 2 X; i0 2 f1; 2g, any
game such that a) the initial state is x0; b) player i0 makes the rst move;
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and c) payo¤s over strategies are given either by equation (1) or by equation
(2). The assumption that X is nonempty compact Hausdor¤ is maintained
throughout the paper. We denote by   the set of all such games when
x0 2 X and i0 2 f1; 2g:   = f (x0; i0) j x0 2 X; i0 2 f1; 2gg. The sets X;A
and functions ui are the same for all games in  .
A strategy prole s = (s1; s2) is a subgame perfect equilibrium for the
set   of games, if for any initial state x0 2 X, s1 maximizes u1(s1; s2)
and s2 maximizes u2(s1; s2), no matter which player starts the game. A
subgame perfect equilibrium s is called Markov perfect if the strategies si
are Markovian, i = 1; 2.
4 Results
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 The graph of A is acyclic and irreexive.
We saw in Examples 1 and 2 that cycles may cause the nonexistence of
an MPE. Livshits (2002) has an example with three players and nitely
many states such that the action correspondence is acyclic but not irreexive
and there are no pure MPE.
Our rst result deals with a special case when a) payo¤s are calculated
as in equation (1), and (ii) the state space is a compact metric space.
Proposition 1 Suppose X is compact metric, the set   of games  (x0; i0)
satises Assumption 1, the functions ui are continuous, and that A(x) is
nite for each x 2 X. Then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium s, if
payo¤s are calculated as in equation (1).
Proof. See Appendix.
REMARK 1. Note that closedness of the action correspondence A was
not needed.
Assumption 2 Every uncountable closed Y  X contains an element y
such that Y \A(y) = ;.
Note that Y \ A(y) = ; is satised in particular when A(y) = ;. So
if X is uncountable, Assumption 2 implies that some action sets A(x) are
empty.
Lemma 2 Suppose A is a closed relation on a compact Hausdor¤ space X
satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. Then there is K > 0 such that all histories
ht have lenght t  K.
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Proof. If there is a nonempty closed Y  X such that A(y) \ Y 6= ; for
all y 2 Y , then there is a nonempty perfect Z  Y such that A(z) \ Z 6= ;.
This follows since A is a closed asymmetric and acyclic relation (Salonen
and Vartiainen 2010, Lemma 2). Since perfect subsets are uncountable, it
follows that every (uncountable or countable) closed Y  X contains y 2 Y
such that A(y) \ Y = ;.
Dene A 1[Z] = fx 2 X j z 2 A(x) for some z 2 Zg, for all nonempty
Z  X. Let X0 = X, and Xn+1 = A 1[Xn] for n = f0; 1; : : :g. Since A is a
closed relation, each A 1[Xn] is closed. We show that for some n > 0, Xn
is empty.
If Xn 6= ; for all n, then Y = \nA 1[Xn] is a nonempty closed subset,
since X is compact Hausdor¤ and Xn+1  Xn. Hence there exists y 2 Y
such that A(y) \ Y = ;. Since A is a closed relation, A(y) is closed. Since
y 2 A 1[Xn] for every n, it follows that A(y)\Xn 6= ;. But then A(y)\Y =
\n(A(y)\A 1[Xn]) 6= ;, a contradiction. Hence there exists a least integer
K such that XK 6= ; and Xn = ; for all n > K.
Let An = Xn n Xn+1 for n < K, and AK = XK . Then each An is
nonempty, and A(x)\Xn = ; for each x 2 An. So for example, A0 contains
all states x such that A(x) = ;, that is, A0 is the set of all end states of  .
The set A1 contains all states x such that A(x) 6= ; and A(x)  A0. So A1
contains all states such that there is exactly one move left before the game
ends. By the same reasoning, Ak contains all states x such that A(x) 6= ;
and k is the maximum number of moves that are needed to end the game,
k  K. Note that less than k moves may su¢ ce to end the game when
k > 1, but the longest path to the end state has k moves.
By using Lemma 1 we can prove the existence of a Markov perfect equi-
librium in games with nite action sets A(x).
Theorem 3 Suppose that the games  (x0; i1) = (X;A; x0; i0; u1; u2) in the
set   have nite action sets A(x); x 2 X. If the closure clA of the relation A
satises Assumptions 1 and 2, then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium
s, if payo¤s are computed either by equation (1) or by equation (2).
Proof. If the action sets were clA(x) instead of A(x) in the games in  , then
the lengths of all histories would have a common upper bound by Lemma
1. Since A(x)  clA(x), all histories ht in games in   must satisfy t  K,
for some K > 0. We may assume that some history has lenght K.
Like in the proof of Lemma 1, X is partitioned into nonempty sets
A0; : : : ; AK such that (1) A(x) = ; i¤ x 2 A0, and (2) A(x) \ At = ;
for all t  k if x 2 Ak. Given any x 2 Ak, it takes at most k steps to reach
a terminal state x 2 A0, and there is some x 2 Ak and some choices such
that it takes k steps to reach a terminal state x 2 A0.
We can solve a Markov perfect equilibrium by applying backwards in-
duction.
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Step 1. Given x 2 A1, solve to each player i 2 f1; 2g a utility maximizing
choice si(x) 2 A(x). Since A(x) is nonempty and nite, these maximizers
exist. After that choice has been made, the game is over.
Step n. Suppose that a Markov perfect equilibrium in continuous strate-
gies s = (s1; s2) has been solved for initial states in x 2 A1 [    [ An 1,
n > 1, no matter who makes the rst move.
Given x 2 An, solve to each player i 2 f1; 2g a utility maximizing initial
choice si(x) 2 A(x), given that equilibrium strategies are followed in the
future. Since A(x) is nonempty and nite, these maximizers exist.
Continue backwards until si(x) is solved for each x 2 Ak; 0 < k  K.
By construction, the prole s = (s1; s2) is a Markov perfect equilibrium.
REMARK 2. Note that Theorem 1 would hold if payo¤s over strategies
were given by functions Ui(s) = Vi(y0; : : : ; yn), where yk = ui(h(s)k), given
some functions Vi over vectors (y0; : : : ; yn) 2 Rn+1; n  0.
REMARK 3. Continuity of ui on X was no need in Theorem 1.
If action sets A(x) are not necessarily nite, Theorem 1 fails even when
the action correspondence A and utility functions ui are continuous. This
was demonstrated in Example 3 in Section 2.
The problem in Example 3 is that the set of terminal histories that last
two periods is not closed. There was a sequence of two-period long termi-
nal histories whose limit was not a terminal history. This non-closedness
caused that there was a jump in the payo¤ function at this limit. The next
assumption takes care of such anomalies.
Assumption 3 For any t > 0, the set of feasible terminal histories (x0; : : : ; xt)
is a closed subset of Xt+1.
The subset of those states y that can be reached from x0 by t steps but
not by t+ 1 steps is closed (possibly empty).
Our second main result gives su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a
Markov perfect equilibrium for games where players utilities are dependent
in the following way.
Assumption 4 For all x; y 2 X, u1(x) = u1(y) i¤ u2(x) = u2(y), .
Let Yi = ui[X], i = 1; 2. We leave the proof of the following Lemma to
the reader.
Lemma 4 If utility functions u1 and u2 are continuous, then Assumption
3 holds i¤ there exists a continuous bijection f : Y1  ! Y2.
We can now prove our second main result.
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Theorem 5 Suppose that the set   of games  (x0; i0) satises Assumptions
1, 2, 3 and 4, and that the correspondence A and functions ui are continuous.
Then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium s, if payo¤s are calculated as
in equation (1).
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that that all histories ht have length t  K, for
some K > 0, and we assume that K is the least such integer. Like in the
proof of Lemma 1, X is partitioned into nonempty sets A0; : : : ; AK such
that (1) A(x) = ; i¤ x 2 A0, and (2) A(x) \ At = ; for all t  k if x 2 Ak.
Given any x 2 Ak, it takes at most k steps to reach a terminal state x 2 A0,
and there is some x 2 Ak and some choices such that it takes k steps to
reach a terminal state x 2 A0.
We apply the backward induction principle to solve for a Markov perfect
equilibrium.
Step 1. Given x 2 A1, solve to each player i 2 f1; 2g a utility maximizing
last choice si(x) 2 A(x). Since ui is continuous and A(x) is nonempty and
closed, these maximizers exist. Since A is continuous, the maximized utility
ui(si(x)) is a continuous function of x by the Berges maximum theorem.
[To see that Berges theorem applies here, note that since A is closed, the
subset A0 is open. Hence X n A0 is closed and compact, and a choice yi(x)
maximizing ui would exists for every x 2 X n A0. By Berges theorem,
ui(yi(x)) is continuous. Since yi = si on the subset A1, ui(si(x)) is a con-
tinuous function of x.] Then also uj(si(x)) = g(ui(si(x))) is a continuous
function of x, j 6= i, where g is either the continuous bijection f of Lemma
2 or its inverse f 1.
Step 2. Given x 2 A2 and player i 2 f1; 2g, let Ai20(x) = A(x) \A0 and
Ai21(x) = A(x)\A1. So Ai20(x) contains those choices for i that will end the
game, and Ai21(x) contains those choices that will give the player j 6= i one
more opportunity to choose. By Assumption 2, these subsets are closed.
If Ai20(x) is nonempty, it contains a nonempty closed subset of elements
y that maximize ui(y). If Ai21(x) is nonempty, it contains a nonempty
closed subset of elements z that maximize ui(z) + ui(sj(z)) since ui(sj(z))
is continuous in z by Step 1. If both Ai20(x) and A
i
21(x) are nonempty,
we nd a nonempty closed set of maximizers of the continuous function
maxfui(y); ui(z) + ui(sj(z))g.
Note that the correspondence A restricted to domain A2 is continuous,
and hence correspondences Ai20 and A
i
21 are continuous on A2 as well. By
the Berges maximum theorem, player is maximized utility depends contin-
uously on x 2 A2. Since ui = f  uj (or ui = f 1  uj) for the continuous
bijection f of Lemma 2, player js utility depends continuously on x 2 A2
as well, via the equilibrium strategy si(x) of i.
Hence a Markov perfect equilibrium strategies s = (s1; s2) have been
solved for initial states in A1 [ A2, no matter who makes the rst move.
In order to keep the notation as simple as possible, we do not index the
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equilibria by the name of the player who starts the game. Notice however
that actually we have solved so far two equilibria: one if player 1 starts the
game and one if player 2 starts the game.
Step n. Suppose that a Markov perfect equilibrium strategies s = (s1; s2)
has been solved for initial states in x 2 A1 [    [ An 1, n > 1, no matter
who makes the rst move.
Given x 2 An and player i 2 f1; 2g, let Ainm(x) = A(x) \ Am for m =
0; : : : ; n  1. So a choice y 2 Ainm(x) means that after y, at most m choices
can be made before the game ends. The proof is exactly the same as in Step
2 except that there are more subsets Ainm(x).
We nd that if Ainm(x) is nonempty, there exists a nonempty closed
subset of elements y 2 Ainm(x) that maximize the function ui(y) + ui(y1) +
   + mui(ym), where y1 = sj(y), y2 = si(y1); : : :, and ym is the state
where the game ends when the equilibrium strategies si; sj solved in steps
n  1; : : : ; 1 are applied. Since there are only nitely many nonempty closed
subsets Ainm(x), a nonempty closed subset of maximizers of the discounted
sum of utilities can be found from A(x).
As in Step 2., the conditions of Berges Maximum Theorem are satised,
so we can nd a maximizer si(x) 2 A(x), i 2 f1; 2g, and playersmaximized
payo¤s depend continuously on x. So a Markov perfect equilibrium exists
when payo¤s are calculated as in equation (1).
A similar existence result holds also when payo¤s are calculated accord-
ing to equation (2).
Theorem 6 Suppose that the set   of games  (x0; i0) satises Assumptions
1, 2, 3 and 4, and that the correspondence A and functions ui are continuous.
Then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium s, if payo¤s are calculated as
in equation (2).
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 2 up to Step 2.
Step 2. Given x 2 A2 and player i 2 f1; 2g, let Ai20(x) = A(x) \A0 and
Ai21(x) = A(x)\A1. So Ai20(x) contains those choices for i that will end the
game, and Ai21(x) contains those choices that will give the player j 6= i one
more opportunity to choose. By Assumption 2, these subsets are closed.
If Ai20(x) is nonempty, it contains a nonempty closed subset of elements
y that maximize ui(y). If Ai21(x) is nonempty, it contains a nonempty closed
subset of elements z that maximize ui(sj(z)) since ui(sj(z)) depends contin-
uously on z. If both Ai20(x) and A
i
21(x) are nonempty, we nd a nonempty
closed set of maximizers of the continuous function maxfui(y); ui(sj(z))g.
Note that the correspondence A restricted to domain A2 is continuous, and
hence correspondences Ai20 and A
i
21 are continuous on A2 as well. By the
Berges Maximum Theorem, player i 2 f1; 2g has a maximizer si(x) 2 A(x)
and his maximized payo¤ depends continuously on x 2 A2. Since ui = f uj
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(or ui = f 1uj) for the continuous bijection f of Lemma 2, player js payo¤
depends continuously on x as well.
Hence a Markov perfect equilibrium s = (s1; s2) has been solved for
initial states in A1 [A2, no matter who makes the rst move.
The rest of the proof is the same as Step n in the proof of Theorem 2,
except that now payo¤s depend only on the states x 2 A0 where the game
ends (in the same way as outlined in Step 2 above).
The following result follows immediately from Theorems 2 and 3.
Corollary 7 Suppose that the set   of games  (x0; i0) satises Assumptions
1 and 2 and that the correspondence A and functions ui are continuous.
Then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium s, if u1 =  u2 and payo¤s
are calculated as in equation (1) or as in equation (2).
5 Discussion
We assume that 1) actions are states: A(x)  X, and that 2) utility at the
current state depends on the current state u(x). None of our results would
change if we assume that
1. utility depends on the action taken at the current state: u(y), for
y 2 A(x);
2. utility depends on the current state and the action taken at this state:
u(x; y), for y 2 A(x);
3. actions are not states: A(x)  A for each x 2 X, where A is a compact
Hausdor¤space, and given current state and action (x; a) the new state
is g(x; a) 2 X where g is a continuos function. Take X 0 = X  A. At
each state x0 = (x; a) dene action subset by A0(x0) = fg(x0)gA(x) if
a 2 A(x) and A0(x0) = ; if a =2 A(x). So at each state x0 = (x; a) new
states (g(x0); b) 2 fg(x0)g  A(x) may be chosen. It is easy to show
that if A is a closed correspondence, then A0 is a closed correspondence
on the compact Hausdor¤ space X 0.
One may wonder if the perfect information assumption is not in con-
tradiction with the Markov property of strategies. We may construct state
spaces in such a way that this is not the case. For example, given the original
state space X, form two identical copies of it by dening X1 = X f1g and
X2 = Xf2g. Then X1 and X2 are disjoint compact Hausdor¤ spaces. Let
the new state space be X 0 = X1[X2. Dene a new action correspondence so
that A0(x1)  X2 for each x1 2 X1 and A0(x2) 2 X1 for each x2 2 X2. The
new correspondence A0 di¤ers from the original A only because it is dened
on tuples x0 = (x; i), and its values are of the form A(x; i) = A(x)fjg; i 6= j.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Begin by indexing by ordinals  those states x
for which A(x) 6= ;, and denote them by x,  <  where  is the cardinality
of X. Apply transinite induction as follows.
The initial step. Take the state x0 and nominate one of the players as
the rst mover. Build a pseudo game to each T > 0 such that all feasible
histories from x0 are at most T periods long, and from that on the action is
always x and both players get payo¤ 0. This is done except in cases when
the terminal history already has length at most T , and these cases are left
as they are. This pseudo game has a pure MPE, sT , and it is the same as
in the extensive form game with at most T period histories that starts from
x0. This holds since nobody actually makes any moves after T periods.
Let T go to innity (and keep x0 the same as above). Let Y T denote
the product of all nonempty action sets at nodes of this tree that have a
T  0 period history. This product set is nite, and we equip it with the
usual topology. Let Y =
Q1
T=0 Y
T with the product topology. Then Y is a
compact metric space. Let xT 2 Y be such that the choices are the same
as in the prole sT when the length of the history is t  T periods. From
period T onwards the same constant x is always chosen independently of
the state.
Then the sequence fxT g1T=0 has a convergent subsequence, and w.l.o.g.
we assume that the sequence itself converges to s 2 Y . By continuity of
payo¤s, s is an MPE. Solve similarly an MPE when i 6= i0 is the rst
mover. Denote by N(x0) the (decision and terminal) nodes that can be
reached from x0, including x0. Then an MPE has been solved for the case
when N(x0) is the state space and A is the original action correspondence
restricted to N(x0).
The induction step. Let  be the least ordinal such that x hasnt yet
been given an action in any MPE. Denote by N(x) the nodes (with
A(x) 6= ;) that can be reached from x, including x, and denote by N
the nodes that have already been given an action in an MPE at an earlier
stage  <  of induction.
Then, as above, solve an MPE (for both players being rst movers) in
the extensive game starting from x when the decision nodes in N\N(x)
are given the actions that have already been assigned to these nodes. Then
an MPE has been solved in the case N [N(x) is the state space and the
action correspondence is A restricted to this set.
Therefore an action si(x) is assigned to both players i = 1; 2 at every
decision node x 2 [N(x) such that these actions form anMPE s when
the state space is [N(x).
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